IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-01816851.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Achieving a fair geographical distribution of health-care resources

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Mougeot

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Florence Naegelen

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

Abstract

This paper analyzes the factors determining the physicians’ location decisions when physicians have heterogeneous preferences about the regional amenities in a two-regions health care system. While the first best allocation entails geographic equality in access to and quality of health-care services, we show that free location decisions results in an unfair allocation in health care resources. We first characterize the public policies allowing to decentralize the first best. Then, we show that the optimal policy aiming at equalizing medical densities consists in setting regionally differentiated prices and a single lump-sum transfer. This transfer is a tax (resp. a subsidy) when the value of the difference in regional amenities is low (resp. high).
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2018. "Achieving a fair geographical distribution of health-care resources," Post-Print hal-01816851, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01816851
    DOI: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2018.03.008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roback, Jennifer, 1982. "Wages, Rents, and the Quality of Life," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1257-1278, December.
    2. Bolduc, Denis & Fortin, Bernard & Fournier, Marc-Andre, 1996. "The Effect of Incentive Policies on the Practice Location of Doctors: A Multinomial Probit Analysis," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(4), pages 703-732, October.
    3. Bardey, David & Canta, Chiara & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie, 2012. "The regulation of health care providers’ payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 691-704.
    4. Joseph P. Newhouse & Albert P. Williams & Bruce W. Bennett & William B. Schwartz, 1982. "Does the Geographical Distribution of Physicians Reflect Market Failure?," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 493-505, Autumn.
    5. Tomoko Ono & Michael Schoenstein & James Buchan, 2014. "Geographic Imbalances in Doctor Supply and Policy Responses," OECD Health Working Papers 69, OECD Publishing.
    6. Martin Gaynor, "undated". "What Do We Know About Competition and Quality in Health Care Markets?," GSIA Working Papers 2006-E62, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    7. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M, 1998. "Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 1093-1110, July.
    8. Ma, Ching-to Albert, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
    9. Gächter, Martin & Schwazer, Peter & Theurl, Engelbert & Winner, Hannes, 2012. "Physician density in a two-tiered health care system," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 257-268.
    10. Kurt R. Brekke & Robert Nuscheler & Odd Rune Straume, 2006. "Quality and Location Choices under Price Regulation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 207-227, March.
    11. Richard Schmalensee, 1977. "Comparative Static Properties of Regulated Airline Oligopolies," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 565-576, Autumn.
    12. Gabrielle Wanzenried & Sandra Nocera, 2008. "The Evolution of Physician Density in Switzerland," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 144(II), pages 247-282, June.
    13. Douglas, George W & Miller, James C, III, 1974. "Quality Competition, Industry Equilibrium, and Efficiency in the Price-Constrained Airline Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(4), pages 657-669, September.
    14. Pope, Gregory C., 1989. "Hospital nonprice competition and medicare reimbursement policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 147-172, June.
    15. Isabel Correia & Paula Veiga, 2010. "Geographic distribution of physicians in Portugal," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 11(4), pages 383-393, August.
    16. repec:bla:jemstr:v:3:y:1994:i:1:p:93-112:a is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Domenico Lisi & Luigi Siciliani & Odd Rune Straume, 2020. "Hospital competition under pay‐for‐performance: Quality, mortality, and readmissions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 289-314, April.
    2. Mougeot, Michel & Naegelen, Florence, 2005. "Hospital price regulation and expenditure cap policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 55-72, January.
    3. Kuhn, Michael & Ochsen, Carsten, 2019. "Population change and the regional distribution of physicians," The Journal of the Economics of Ageing, Elsevier, vol. 14(C).
    4. Pedro Ramos & Hélio Alves & Paulo Guimarães & Maria A. Ferreira, 2017. "Junior doctors’ medical specialty and practice location choice: simulating policies to overcome regional inequalities," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 18(8), pages 1013-1030, November.
    5. Martin Gaynor & Kate Ho & Robert J. Town, 2015. "The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 53(2), pages 235-284, June.
    6. Mak, Henry Y., 2018. "Managing imperfect competition by pay for performance and reference pricing," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 131-146.
    7. Martin Gaynor, "undated". "What Do We Know About Competition and Quality in Health Care Markets?," GSIA Working Papers 2006-E62, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    8. Brekke, Kurt R. & Cellini, Roberto & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2010. "Competition and quality in health care markets: A differential-game approach," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 508-523, July.
    9. Oddvar Kaarboe & Luigi Siciliani, 2011. "Multi‐tasking, quality and pay for performance," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(2), pages 225-238, February.
    10. Siciliani, Luigi & Stanciole, Anderson & Jacobs, Rowena, 2009. "Do waiting times reduce hospital costs?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 771-780, July.
    11. Siciliani, Luigi, 2006. "Selection of treatment under prospective payment systems in the hospital sector," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 479-499, May.
    12. Martin Gaynor & Rodrigo Moreno-Serra & Carol Propper, 2013. "Death by Market Power: Reform, Competition, and Patient Outcomes in the National Health Service," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 134-166, November.
    13. Elin Johanna Gudrun Hafsteinsdottir & Luigi Siciliani, 2010. "DRG prospective payment systems: refine or not refine?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(10), pages 1226-1239, October.
    14. Chalkley, Martin & McVicar, Duncan, 2008. "Choice of contracts in the British National Health Service: An empirical study," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 1155-1167, September.
    15. Hugh Gravelle & Rita Santos & Luigi Siciliani & Rosalind Goudie, 2012. "Hospital Quality Competition Under Fixed Prices," Working Papers 080cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
    16. Schuster, Stephan, 2012. "Applications in Agent-Based Computational Economics," MPRA Paper 47201, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Cellini, Roberto & Brekke, Kurt Richard & Siciliani, Luigi, 2008. "Competition and Quality in Regulated Markets: a Differential-Game Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 6801, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Isabel Correia & Paula Veiga, 2010. "Geographic distribution of physicians in Portugal," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 11(4), pages 383-393, August.
    19. Bardey, David & Canta, Chiara & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie, 2012. "The regulation of health care providers’ payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 691-704.
    20. Brekke, Kurt R. & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2012. "Quality competition with profit constraints," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 642-659.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I14 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health and Inequality
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01816851. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.