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Meso-institutions: The variety of regulatory arrangements in the water sector

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  • Claude Ménard

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UP1 UFR02 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - École d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, NUS - National University of Singapore)

Abstract

There are many different ways to regulate water utilities. By focusing almost exclusively on regulatory agencies, the literature has missed important alternatives regarding the mechanisms through which the general rules of the game, defined at the macro-institutional level, interact with operators organizing transactions at the micro-level. Building on recent developments in organization theory and on the distinction between property rights and decision rights, this paper explores the variety of arrangements, identified as ‘meso-institutions,' providing these links. The analysis is substantiated through a comparative approach to the drinkable water systems in France, England and Whales, and the Netherlands.

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Ménard, 2017. "Meso-institutions: The variety of regulatory arrangements in the water sector," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-04011777, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-04011777
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2017.05.001
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    2. Tolstoguzov, Oleg, 2021. "О Возможности Эффективного Ответа На Индустриальный Вызов В Контексте Взаимодействия Человека И Природы [On the possibility of an effective response to the industrial challenge in the context of hu," MPRA Paper 110808, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Gaetano Martino & Daniela Toccaceli & Alessandro Pacciani & Michela Ascani, 2019. "The Interbranch organizations in the cap reform: Institutional nature, opportunities and limits," Economia agro-alimentare, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 21(2), pages 315-334.

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