An Economic Mechanism to Regulate Multispecies Fisheries
We study the management of a multispecies fishery, exploited under a non-selective harvesting technology. We construct an economic mechanism to regulate the fishery. Under a large class of models, capable of accounting for imperfect competition, congestion externalities, pro-social motivations and/or resource amenities, we show that any (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibrium of the differential game induced by our economic mechanism implements an optimal utilization of the resource. Using a specification of the general model, which adapts Clemhout and Wan (1985) and can be solved explicitly, we exhibit a (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibrium of the differential game, proving existence of (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibria within this environment.
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