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An Economic Mechanism to Regulate Multispecies Fisheries


  • Sébastien ROUILLON (GREThA, CNRS, UMR 5113)


We study the management of a multispecies fishery, exploited under a non-selective harvesting technology. We construct an economic mechanism to regulate the fishery. Under a large class of models, capable of accounting for imperfect competition, congestion externalities, pro-social motivations and/or resource amenities, we show that any (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibrium of the differential game induced by our economic mechanism implements an optimal utilization of the resource. Using a specification of the general model, which adapts Clemhout and Wan (1985) and can be solved explicitly, we exhibit a (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibrium of the differential game, proving existence of (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibria within this environment.

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  • Sébastien ROUILLON (GREThA, CNRS, UMR 5113), 2012. "An Economic Mechanism to Regulate Multispecies Fisheries," Cahiers du GREThA 2012-23, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
  • Handle: RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2012-23

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    Natural resource; Fish war; Multispecies; Differential game; Mechanism design.;

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