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Pôles de compétitivité, incertitude et adoption de technologies génériques

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  • Iritié, J.J.

Abstract

Les pôles de compétitivité, ou clusters d'innovation, sont au coeur de la nouvelle politique industrielle française. Ils ont pour objet de favoriser un environnement propice à linnovation à fort potentiel technologique, source de compétitivité et de croissance. L'objectif de ce papier est d'analyser l'effet de ce dispositif industriel sur l'adoption de technologie générique dans une situation d'information imparfaite. Pour ce faire, l'auteur développe un modèle de relation verticale, décrite sous forme d'un jeu en quatre étapes, entre un secteur amont fournisseur d'une technologie générique innovante et un secteur utilisateur aval. Le secteur aval ignore la qualité et la profitabilité de cette innovation technologique. L'auteur modélise la mise en place du pôle de compétitivité comme un accroissement, pour la firme aval, de la probabilité de recevoir un signal relatif à la qualité de l'innovation, et il montre que : (1) le dispositif des pôles de compétitivité influence le choix de la qualité du bien générique en amont, (2) améliore le niveau d'investissement en R&D de la firme aval ainsi que son niveau d'utilisation du bien générique de qualité haute, (3) enfin, permet l'alignement des incitations à innover des secteurs amont et aval et améliore le bien-être social lorsque les technologies amont et aval sont de haute qualité. Tous ces résultats théoriques sont en faveur de l'amélioration de la compétitivité des entreprises membres du pôle de compétivité et de la croissance économique locale.

Suggested Citation

  • Iritié, J.J., 2012. "Pôles de compétitivité, incertitude et adoption de technologies génériques," Working Papers 201203, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
  • Handle: RePEc:gbl:wpaper:201203
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    File URL: https://gael.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/sites/gael/files/doc-recherche/WP/A2012/gael2012-03.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    POLE DE COMPETITIVITE; INFORMATION IMPARFAITE; SIGNAL PARFAIT; TECHNOLOGIE GENERIQUE; ADOPTION; INNOVATION; POLITIQUE INDUSTRIELLE; FRANCE;

    JEL classification:

    • L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General
    • O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
    • R10 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General

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