Saving Behaviour in Stationary Equilibrium with Random Discounting
In this paper we study the implications of random discount rates of future generations for saving behavior and capital holdings in steady-state competitive equilibrium. We examine conditions under which this randomness is sufficient for households other than the most patient to save, thus providing a simple and natural way to overcome a difficulty encountered in deterministic models.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
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Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/foerder.aspEmail:
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