Dynamic Incentives, Occupational Choice, and the American Dream
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References listed on IDEAS
- Neil R. Ericsson & Jaime Marquez, 1998. "A framework for economic forecasting," Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 1(Conferenc), pages 228-266.
- Franz, Wolfgang & Göggelmann, Klaus & Schellhorn, Martin & Winker, Peter, 1998. "Quasi-Monte Carlo Methods in Stochastic Simulations: An Application to Fiscal Policy Simulations using an Aggregate Disequilibrium Model of the West German Economy," ZEW Discussion Papers 98-03, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dilip Mookherjee & Debraj Ray, 2002.
"Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 818-849, September.
- Dilip Mookherjee & Debraj Ray, 2000. "Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 107, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
- Dilip Mookherjee & Debraj Ray, 2000. "Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1538, Econometric Society.
- Huw Lloyd-Ellis, 2003. "On the Impact of Inequality on Productivity Growth in the Short and Long Term: A Synthesis," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 29(s1), pages 65-86, January.
- Dilip Mookherjee, 1999. "Contractual Constraints on Firm Performance in Developing Countries," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 98, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
More about this item
KeywordsMORAL HAZARD ; GENERATIONS ; INFORMATION ; LABOUR ; INCENTIVES;
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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