Dynamic Incentives, Occupational Choice, and the American Dream
This paper introduces an overlapping generations model of the principal-agent problem. all individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Bargaining power and incentive contracts in the principle-agent relationships are determined by market forces.
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|Date of creation:||2000|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY PARK PENNSYLVANIA 16802 U.S.A.|
Web page: http://econ.la.psu.edu/
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