Extending Market Power through Vertical Integration
This paper derives a model of vertical integration when it is difficult to write binding long-term supply price contracts. Thus, a vertical separated monopolist is vulnerable to hold-up. Without integration, the authors demonstrate that a bottleneck monopolist has an incentive to encourage more firms in a related segment than would arise in a pure monopoly.
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|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
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