Multiple Equilibria in Exchange Economies with Homothetic, Nearly Identical Preferences
For agents with identical homothetic preferences (but possibly different endowments), aggregate excess demand can be derived from maximization of a utility function of a representative agent whose endowment is the sum of the individual's endowments. Such an economy has a unique equilibrium. In this paper, a metric p is defined on the set P of preference relations representable by CES utility functions. It is then shown that there are agentswhose preference relations in P are arbitrarily close to one another in t he metric p, and there are endowments for these agents, such that the resulting exchange economy has a multiple Walrasian equilibria.
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|Date of creation:||1996|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, MINNEAPOLIS MINNESOTA 35455 U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.econ.umn.edu/
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