Economic Policy, Model Uncertainty and Elections
We analyse a game theoretical model in which policy makers have superior knowledge about the working of the economy relative to voters. We show that parties increase their chances of reelection by basing their policies on the model that best fits in with their preferences. Moreover, we show that if parties care much about holding office, they may deliberately base their policies on a model that is electorally attractive, even if this model does not describe the working of the economy correctly. Our paper provides an explanation for the observation that different political parties subscribe to different economic philosophies. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1993|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: ERASMUS UNIVERSITY OF ROTTERDAM, INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEOB.O. BOX 1738 ROTTERDAM THE NETHERLANDS.|
Phone: 31 10 4081111
Web page: http://www.few.eur.nl/few/
More information through EDIRC