Investment in Human Capital, Appropriation, and Mandatory Schooling
High inequality in human capital may result in appropriation. In anticipation, the rich may favor policies which induce a more equal distribution of human capital, such as income transfers and mandatory schooling. This paper compares several such alternatives. We find that mandatory schooling results in higher incomes for both the rich and the poor sons, and increases the welfare of all. Moreover, it is the optimal policy for the rich, even when schools are fully financed by the rich.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:calirv:99-00-23. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.