Redistribution, Political Power, and Public Goods
The core of the argument offered here is that the trade off between these two choices boils down to a benefit cost calculation rather than a Bergsonian or Arrovian value judgement: i.e., in return for the net benefits which a society obtains from the productive, public good supplying activities of a social order, it must pay costs in the form of redistriubtion to favored and powerful groups -- costs which its form of governance exacts. Both the allocative and the redistributive expenditures of governments are financed from taxation or private production/consumption.
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|Date of creation:||2000|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.|
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