"Redistribution, Political Power, and Public Goods"
As a feature of positive redistribution, what incentive causes those with the power of transferring wealth to stop short of extremes in confiscationand even to a degree to serve the interests of the powerless and the wider soviety as a whole? A beginning approach to this problem has been made by McGuire and Olson (1994, 1996) [hereafter "M-O"]. This paper constructs a simplified, comparative static version of Barro to enrich the M-O analysis of the positive political economy of redistribution.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
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