The Prudent Village: A Corroboration of Kimball's Conjecture
The prudent peasant mitigated the risk of crop failure by scattering his arable land Throughout his village, McCloskey argued, because formal insurance institutions did not exist. A Village of rational peasants facing idiosyncratic risks, Kimball replied, should have helped each other through hard times. This essay corroborates Kimball's conjecture by providing peasants in medieval England pooled risk through three institutions that fit Kimball's definition of farmers' cooperatives.
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|Date of creation:||1999|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.|
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