Commitment Problems Justify Subsidies For Medical Insurance
Consumers who believe that government will provide them with some public medical care, even if they did not purchase medical insurance, may choose to purchase no such insurance. The amount of medical care consumed will then be less than the first-best optimum. Under specified conditions government can then increase the welfare of consumers by subsidizing insurance, or by providing public health care at a more generous level than the minimum it would otherwise give. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1992) 17, 137â€“145. doi:10.1007/BF00962710
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1991|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:calirv:90-91-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.