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Sticks and Carrots for the Alleviation of Long Term Poverty

Author

Listed:
  • Schroyen, F.
  • Torsvik, G.

Abstract

Work requirements can make it easier to screen the poor from the non-poor. They can also affect future poverty by changing the poors' incentive to invest in their income capacity. The novelty of our study is the focus on long term poverty.

Suggested Citation

  • Schroyen, F. & Torsvik, G., 2001. "Sticks and Carrots for the Alleviation of Long Term Poverty," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 2001, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:bereco:2001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1991. "Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1345-1351, December.
    2. Xavier Freixas & Roger Guesnerie & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(2), pages 173-191.
    3. Joan R. Rodgers & John L. Rodgers, 1993. "Chronic Poverty in the United States," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 28(1), pages 25-54.
    4. Gibson, John, 2001. "Measuring chronic poverty without a panel," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 243-266, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fred Schroyen & Gaute Torsvik, 2005. "Work Requirements and Long‐Term Poverty," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(3), pages 427-448, August.
    2. Rebecca M. Blank, 2003. "U.S. Welfare Reform: What's Relevant for Europe?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 49(1), pages 49-74.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    POVERTY ; INCOME ; INVESTMENTS;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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