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Information, Incentives and Organizations; some Intertemporal Aspects


  • Olsen, T.E.
  • Torsvik, G.


The paper presents some recent research that examines, in the principal-agent framework, interaction effects of organizational design and incentives in the presence of asymmetric information and limited commitments.

Suggested Citation

  • Olsen, T.E. & Torsvik, G., 1999. "Information, Incentives and Organizations; some Intertemporal Aspects," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 1799, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:bereco:1799

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1991. "Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1345-1351, December.
    2. Xavier Freixas & Roger Guesnerie & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 173-191.
    3. Joan R. Rodgers & John L. Rodgers, 1993. "Chronic Poverty in the United States," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 28(1), pages 25-54.
    4. Gibson, John, 2001. "Measuring chronic poverty without a panel," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 243-266, August.
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    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations


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