Performance Related Pay: Determinants and Efefcts on Managers Pay
The purpose of this paper is to test some predictions from the literature concerning firms' choices of methods of pay for their managerial employees, and to provide estimates of the effects of performance pay on individual productivity using individual earnings as a mesure of productivity.
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|Date of creation:||1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Faculty of Business Administration. The Aarhus School of Business. Fuglesangs Alle 4. DK- 8210 Aarhus V - Denmark|
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