Asymmetric default bias in dishonesty – how defaults work but only when in one’s favor
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- Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2016.
"Preferences for Truth-Telling,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
6087, CESifo Group Munich.
- Abeler, Johannes & Nosenzo, Daniele & Raymond, Collin, 2016. "Preferences for Truth-Telling," IZA Discussion Papers 10188, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo & Collin Raymond, 2016. "Preferences for truth-telling," Discussion Papers 2016-13, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
More about this item
KeywordsDice task; Cheating; Default bias;
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-04-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2013-04-13 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2013-04-13 (Experimental Economics)
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