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Greed as a Source of Polarization

Author

Listed:
  • Igor Livshits
  • Mark L. J. Wright

Abstract

The political process in the United States appears to be highly polarized: evidence from voting patterns finds that the political positions of legislators have diverged substantially, while the largest campaign contributions come from the most extreme lobby groups and are directed to the most extreme candidates. Is the rise in campaign contributions the cause of the growing polarity of political views? In this paper, we show that, in standard models of lobbying and electoral competition, a free-rider problem amongst potential contributors leads naturally to a divergence in campaign contributors without any divergence in candidates' policy positions. However, we go on to show that a modest departure from standard assumptions | allowing candidates to directly value campaign contributions (because of \ego rents\" or because lax auditing allows them to misappropriate some of these funds) | delivers the ability of campaign contributions to cause policy divergence.

Suggested Citation

  • Igor Livshits & Mark L. J. Wright, 2017. "Greed as a Source of Polarization," Working Papers 18-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:18-1
    DOI: 10.21799/frbp.wp.2022.29
    Note: this paper is SUPERCEDED by WP 22-29 "Polarized Contributions but Convergent Agenda"
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    Cited by:

    1. Tarhan, Simge, 2010. "Campaign Contributions and Political Polarization," MPRA Paper 29617, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Mar 2011.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Polarization; Campaign Contributions; Agendas;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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