The bank as grim reaper: debt composition and recoveries on defaulted debt
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Dionne, Georges & Laajimi, Sadok, 2012.
"On the determinants of the implied default barrier,"
Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 395-408.
- Georges Dionne & Sadok Laajimi, 2009. "On the Determinants of the Implied Default Barrier," Cahiers de recherche 0914, CIRPEE.
- Dionne, Georges & Laajimi, Sadok, 2011. "On the determinants of the implied default barrier," Working Papers 09-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
- Frank Ranganai Matenda & Mabutho Sibanda & Eriyoti Chikodza & Victor Gumbo, 2021. "Determinants of corporate exposure at default under distressed economic and financial conditions in a developing economy: the case of Zimbabwe," Risk Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(1), pages 123-149, June.
- Michael Jacobs, 2012. "An empirical study of the returns on defaulted debt," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(7), pages 563-579, April.
- Bourgeon, Jean-Marc & Dionne, Georges, 2013.
"On debt service and renegotiation when debt-holders are more strategic,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 353-372.
- Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Georges Dionne, 2007. "On Debt Service and Renegotiation when Debt-holders Are More Strategic," Cahiers de recherche 0729, CIRPEE.
- Bourgeon, Jean-Marc & Dionne, Georges, 2007. "On debt service and renegotiation when debt-holders are more strategic," Working Papers 07-7, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
- Jean Marc J. M. Bourgeon & Georges G. Dionne, 2013. "On debt service and renegotiation when debt-holders are more strategic [Sur le service de la dette et la renégociation lorsque les détenteurs de la dette sont plus stratégiques]," Post-Print hal-01000655, HAL.
- Joshua D. Rauh & Amir Sufi, 2010.
"Capital Structure and Debt Structure,"
The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(12), pages 4242-4280, December.
- Joshua D. Rauh & Amir Sufi, 2008. "Capital Structure and Debt Structure," NBER Working Papers 14488, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Zhang, Zhipeng, 2009. "Recovery Rates and Macroeconomic Conditions: The Role of Loan Covenants," MPRA Paper 17521, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Devjak Srečko, 2018. "Modeling of Cash Flows from Nonperforming Loans in a Commercial Bank," Naše gospodarstvo/Our economy, Sciendo, vol. 64(4), pages 3-9, December.
- Michael Jacobs, Jr, 2011. "An option theoretic model for ultimate loss-given-default with systematic recovery risk and stochastic returns on defaulted debt," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Portfolio and risk management for central banks and sovereign wealth funds, volume 58, pages 257-285, Bank for International Settlements.
- Jorge Cruz Lopez & Alfredo Ibanez, 2020. "European Puts, Credit Protection, and Endogenous Default," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20205, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Zhang, Zhipeng, 2009. "Who Pulls the Plug? Theory and Evidence on Corporate Bankruptcy Decisions," MPRA Paper 17676, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Oct 2009.
- Mili, Medhi & Sahut, Jean-Michel & Teulon, Frédéric, 2018. "Modeling recovery rates of corporate defaulted bonds in developed and developing countries," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 28-44.
- Michael Moise & James M. O'Brien & John Tschirhart & Emily Yang, 2007. "Bank commercial loan fair value practices," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2007-29, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedhpr:1056. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lauren Wiese (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbchus.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.