Le "risque judiciaire" et les licenciements en France : le point de vue de l’économie du risque
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Eric Langlais, 2008. "Le "risque judiciaire" et les licenciements en France: le point de vue de l’économie du risque," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-31, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Langlais, Eric, 2008.
"Le "risque judiciaire" et les licenciements en France: le point de vue de l'économie du risque
[The "judicial risk" and lay-offs in France from the point of view of the economic," MPRA Paper 8845, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
- Abowd, John M. & Kramarz, Francis, 2003. "The costs of hiring and separations," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(5), pages 499-530, October.
- Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1992. "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 297-323, October.
- Farber, Henry S & Bazerman, Max H, 1987. "Why Is There Disagreement in Bargaining?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 347-352, May.
- Francis Kramarz & Marie-Laure Michaud, 2002.
"The Shape of Hiring and Separation Costs,"
2002-38, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Kramarz, Francis & Michaud, Marie-Laure, 2004. "The Shape of Hiring and Separation Costs," IZA Discussion Papers 1170, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Kramarz, Francis & Michaud, Marie-Laure, 2003. "The Shape of Hiring and Separation Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 3685, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tversky, Amos & Wakker, Peter, 1995. "Risk Attitudes and Decision Weights," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1255-1280, November.
- Ichino, Andrea & Polo, Michele & Rettore, Enrico, 2003. "Are judges biased by labor market conditions?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 913-944, October.
- Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2002. "Pretrial bargaining with self-serving bias and asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 163-176, June.
- Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1994. "Pretrial negotiations with asymmetric information on risk preferences," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 273-281, September.
More about this item
Keywordslicenciements; Prud’Hommes; risque judiciaire;
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers
- K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fie:wpaper:0807. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sebastien Liarte). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/grnanfr.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.