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Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch Requirements

Author

Listed:
  • Michele Moretto

    (University of Padova)

  • Cesare Dosi

    (University of Padova)

Abstract

We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - "lowest price to consumers" vs "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate the contract. In turn, the relative advantages of each award criterion are affected by the concessioning conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Michele Moretto & Cesare Dosi, 2009. "Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch Requirements," Working Papers 2009.23, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.23
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    Cited by:

    1. Michele Moretto & Cesare Dosi, 2010. "Licences, "Use or Lose" Provisions and the Time of Investment," Working Papers 2010.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Concessions; Auctions; Award criteria; Service Rollout Time limits;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing

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