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Poptávková funkce na trhu s pojištěním: porovnání maximalizace paretovské pravděpodobnosti přežití s teorií EUT von-Neumanna a Morgensterna a s prospektovou teorií Kahnemana a Tverského / Demand for Insurance: Comparison of von Neumann-Morgenstern's and Kahneman-Tverovsky's Approaches [available in Czech only]

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Abstract

This paper shows results of comparison of the original theoretical conception of modeling human decisions under risk with two well known models. In the paper the demand function for insurance is constructed for the model of maximization of the probability of agent’s (economical) survival. This demand function is compared with the demand function in two models: the expected-utility theory (von-Neumann, Morgenstern) and the asymmetric value function (Kahnemann, Tversky). While in the expected-utility model the purest agents are interested in insurance in the first place, in the model of Kahnemann-Tversky purest agents do not buy insurance because of their liking for risk. The model of maximization of the probability of survival corresponds better to the real structure of insured: neither extremely rich people, nor extremely poor people accept insurance contracts. The first ones do not accept the game because of negative expected value of gains, for the second ones is the insurance – in relation to their income - too expensive.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiří Hlaváček & Michal Hlaváček, 2006. "Poptávková funkce na trhu s pojištěním: porovnání maximalizace paretovské pravděpodobnosti přežití s teorií EUT von-Neumanna a Morgensterna a s prospektovou teorií Kahnemana a Tverského / Demand for I," Working Papers IES 2006/14, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised May 2006.
  • Handle: RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2006_14
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    Keywords

    moral hazard; adverse selection; Pareto survival distribution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies

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