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Timing of environmental inspections: Survival of the compliant1


  • Sandra Rousseau

    () (K.U.Leuven-Center for Economic Studies)


Environmental inspection agencies have limited resources. A natural response to this shortage of resources is targeting. The agency will inspect the firms it suspects to be noncompliant. This targeting policy leads to higher compliance than random inspections. This paper uses individual inspection data on the timing policy of the environmental agency. We focus on the probability that firms in the textile industry in Flanders (Belgium) will be inspected by the environmental inspection agency at a particular moment in time given that the firm was not inspected for t periods prior to that moment. We use a survival model to show that the environmental agency inspects firms in a nonrandom way and investigate the factors that influence the probability of inspection.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandra Rousseau, 2004. "Timing of environmental inspections: Survival of the compliant1," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0403, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  • Handle: RePEc:ete:etewps:ete0403

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Dellink, Rob & Hofkes, Marjan & van Ierland, Ekko & Verbruggen, Harmen, 2004. "Dynamic modelling of pollution abatement in a CGE framework," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 965-989, December.
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    More about this item


    Litigation process; Illegal behaviour and the Enforcement of Law Natural resource economics;

    JEL classification:

    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • Q00 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General - - - General

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