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Are NIMBY'S commuters?

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  • Bert Saveyn

Abstract

This paper considers a metropolitan area where residents can commute between several jurisdictions. These residents show NIMBY behavior (Not-In-My-Backyard). They try to preserve their living quality by pushing their polluting economic activity to the neighboring jurisdictions, while keeping their labor income as commuters. This induces a race-to-the-top among jurisdictions. Fiercer competition due to a higher number of jurisdictions intensifies this race-to-the-top; commuting costs, pollution taxes, payroll taxes and bigger jurisdictions increase rather than decrease the incentive for more pollution.

Suggested Citation

  • Bert Saveyn, 2006. "Are NIMBY'S commuters?," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces0604, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    • Handle: RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0604
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    Cited by:

    1. Saveyn Bert, 2006. "Does Commuting Change the ranking of environmental instruments?," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0603, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Commuting; NIMBY; inter-jurisdictional competition; environmental federalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H - Public Economics
    • Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics
    • R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics

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    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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