Optimal Income Taxation in an Equilibrium Unemployment Model : Mirrlees meets Pissarides
This paper characterizes optimal non-linear income taxation in an economy with a continuum of unobservable productivity levels and endogenous involuntary unemployment due to frictions in the labor markets. Redistributive taxation distorts labor demand and wages. Compared to the laissez-faire, gross wages, unemployment and participation are lower. Average tax rates are increasing. Marginal tax rates are positive, even the top. Finally, numerical simulations suggest that redistribution is much more important in our setting than in a comparable Mirrlees (1971) setting.
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