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The Value of the “Too Big to Fail” Big Bank Subsidy

Author

Listed:
  • Dean Baker
  • Travis McArthur

Abstract

One outcome of the TARP and other bank rescue efforts following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008 is that the United States has essentially formalized a commitment to a “too big to fail” (TBTF) policy for major banks. This paper uses data from the FDIC on the relative cost of funds for TBTF banks and other banks, before and after the crisis, to quantify the value of the government protection provided by the TBTF policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Dean Baker & Travis McArthur, 2009. "The Value of the “Too Big to Fail” Big Bank Subsidy," CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs 2009-36, Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR).
  • Handle: RePEc:epo:papers:2009-36
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    File URL: http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/too-big-to-fail-2009-09.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Josh Bivens & Lawrence Mishel, 2013. "The Pay of Corporate Executives and Financial Professionals as Evidence of Rents in Top 1 Percent Incomes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 57-78, Summer.
    2. Edward Kane, 2010. "Redefining and Containing Systemic Risk," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 38(3), pages 251-264, September.
    3. Breton, R. & Pinto, C. & Weber, P.F., 2012. "Banks, moral hazard, and public debts," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 16, pages 57-70, April.
    4. Mario Häfeli & Matthias P. Jüttner, 2012. "The Value of the Liability Insurance for Credit Suisse and UBS," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(4), pages 612-635, December.
    5. Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (ed.), 2010. "Chancen für einen stabilen Aufschwung. Jahresgutachten 2010/11," Annual Economic Reports / Jahresgutachten, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, volume 127, number 201011.
    6. Edward Kane, 2010. "The Importance of Monitoring and Mitigating the Safety-Net Consequences of Regulation-Induced Innovation," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 68(2), pages 145-161.
    7. Doluca, Hasan & Klüh, Ulrich & Wagner, Marco & Weder di Mauro, Beatrice, 2010. "Reducing systemic relevance: A proposal," Working Papers 04/2010, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
    8. Michael G. Jacobides, 2015. "What drove the financial crisis? Structuring our historical understanding of a predictable evolutionary disaster," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 57(5), pages 716-735, July.
    9. Klaas H. W. Knot & Hanne van Voorden, 2013. "Sytemically Important Banks - Possible Options for Policy Makers," Chapters,in: Stability of the Financial System, chapter 12 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Jakob Korbinian Eberl, 2016. "The Collateral Framework of the Eurosystem and Its Fiscal Implications," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 69, January.
    11. Toader, Oana, 2015. "Quantifying and explaining implicit public guarantees for European banks," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 136-147.
    12. Robert E. Prasch, 2011. "After the Crash of 2008: Financial Reform in an Age of Plutocracy," Chapters,in: The Global Financial Crisis, chapter 9 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Kane, Edward J., 2012. "Missing elements in US financial reform: A Kübler-Ross interpretation of the inadequacy of the Dodd-Frank Act," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 654-661.
    14. Randall Kroszner, 2016. "A Review of Bank Funding Cost Differentials," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 151-174, June.
    15. Ueda, Kenichi & Weder di Mauro, B., 2013. "Quantifying structural subsidy values for systemically important financial institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 3830-3842.
    16. Noss, Joseph & Sowerbutts, Rhiannon, 2012. "Financial Stability Paper No 15: The implicit subsidy of banks," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 15, Bank of England.
    17. Günther, Susanne, 2013. "Eine ökonomische Analyse der Systemrelevanz von Banken," Arbeitspapiere 139, University of Münster, Institute for Cooperatives.
    18. Aaron Pacitti, 2016. "After Occupy: Economic Democracy for the 21st Century," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 679-681, September.
    19. Bhagat, Sanjai & Bolton, Brian & Lu, Jun, 2015. "Size, leverage, and risk-taking of financial institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 520-537.
    20. Siegert, Casper & Willison, Matthew, 2015. "Financial Stability Paper 32: Estimating the extent of the ‘too big to fail’ problem – a review of existing approaches," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 32, Bank of England.
    21. Rita Babihuga & Marco Spaltro, 2014. "Bank Funding Costs for International Banks," IMF Working Papers 14/71, International Monetary Fund.
    22. Bank for International Settlements, 2011. "The impact of sovereign credit risk on bank funding conditions," CGFS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 43.
    23. International Monetary Fund, 2011. "Iceland; Advancing Tax Reform and the Taxation of Natural Resources," IMF Staff Country Reports 11/138, International Monetary Fund.
    24. Xiaoqiang Cheng & Patrick Van Cayseele, 2009. "State Aid and Competition in Banking: the Case of China in the Late Nineties," LICOS Discussion Papers 25009, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
    25. De Caux, Robert & McGroarty, Frank & Brede, Markus, 2017. "The evolution of risk and bailout strategy in banking systems," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 468(C), pages 109-118.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federal Reserve; Treasury; banks;

    JEL classification:

    • G - Financial Economics
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H - Public Economics
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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