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Contracts and domination in incomplete markets


  • Marakulin Valery



A domination concept, based on the notion of an exchange contract, is proposed and studied in this paper. Doing so, the classical notion of domination via coalitions is transmitted onto systems (webs) of contracts and onto allocations, whose stability is investigated. This way, the proposed concept of a core for incomplete markets is described as a set of allocations realized by the webs of contracts that have a special kind of stability relative to the breaking of existing contracts and relative to the ability to sign new contracts. This concept converts into classical core when the market turns complete. Under perfect competition conditions, core allocations are equilibria. These properties prove that the studied core concept is valid.

Suggested Citation

  • Marakulin Valery, 2003. "Contracts and domination in incomplete markets," EERC Working Paper Series 02-04e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
  • Handle: RePEc:eer:wpalle:02-04e

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    Cited by:

    1. Marakulin, V.M., 2013. "On the Edgeworth conjecture for production economies with public goods: A contract-based approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 189-200.
    2. Valeriy M. Marakulin, 2017. "Contracts and domination in incomplete markets: what is a true core?," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 81-108, April.
    3. Marakulin Valery, 2006. "On convergence of contractual trajectories in pure exchange economies," EERC Working Paper Series 06-07e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    4. Valery M. Marakulin, 2009. "Economies with Asymmetrically Informed Agents: the Concept of Limit Information," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 1-2, pages 62-85.

    More about this item


    Russia; incomplete markets; core; contract; contractual allocation; competitive equilibrium;

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

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