Contracts and domination in incomplete markets
A domination concept, based on the notion of an exchange contract, is proposed and studied in this paper. Doing so, the classical notion of domination via coalitions is transmitted onto systems (webs) of contracts and onto allocations, whose stability is investigated. This way, the proposed concept of a core for incomplete markets is described as a set of allocations realized by the webs of contracts that have a special kind of stability relative to the breaking of existing contracts and relative to the ability to sign new contracts. This concept converts into classical core when the market turns complete. Under perfect competition conditions, core allocations are equilibria. These properties prove that the studied core concept is valid.
|Date of creation:||24 Sep 2003|
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