Truth-telling and the Role of Limited Liability in Costly State Verification Loan Contracts
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- repec:dau:papers:123456789/6457 is not listed on IDEAS
- Annamaria Menichini, 2000. "Third parties as an incentive to comply," CSEF Working Papers 41, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jan 2006.
- David Alary & Christian Gollier, 2004. "Debt Contract, Strategic Default, and Optimal Penalties with Judgement Errors," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 5(2), pages 357-372, November.
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Keywordsloan contracts; costly state verification; commitment; limited liability;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- G0 - Financial Economics - - General
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