IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecj/ac2003/180.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Product market integration and endogenous bargaining structure

Author

Listed:
  • Santoni, Michele

    (University degli Studi di Milano)

Abstract

This paper focuses on the effects of product market integration on wage-bargaining institutions in a one-way trade model of an international Cournot oligopoly. It shows that product market integration (i.e. a reduction in trade costs either from an arbitrary or from its optimal level) lowers the incentives to centralisation for home unions, given that firms always prefer decentralisation, making it more likely that a decentralised wage bargaining structure occurs in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Santoni, Michele, 2003. "Product market integration and endogenous bargaining structure," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 180, Royal Economic Society.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2003:180
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repec.org/res2003/Santoni.pdf
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Torben M. Andersen, 2003. "Wage formation and European integration," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 188, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    2. Torben M. Andersen & Allan Sørensen, 2008. "Product Market Integration and Heterogeneity-Rent Sharing and Pricing to Market," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 268-284, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining institutions; unionised oligopolies; trade integration;

    JEL classification:

    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2003:180. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/resssea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.