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Stable Marriage With and Without Transferable Utility:Nonparametric Testable Implications


  • Laurens Cherchye
  • Thomas Demuynck
  • Bram De Rock
  • Frederic Vermeulen


We show that transferable utility has no nonparametrically testable implications for marriage stability in settings with a single consumption observation per house- hold and heterogeneous individual preferences across households. This completes the results of Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2017), who characterized Pareto efficient household consumption under the assumption of marriage stability without transferable utility. First, we show that the nonparametric testable conditions established by these authors are not only necessary but also sufficient for rationalizability by a stable marriage matching. Next, we demonstrate that exactly the same testable implications hold with and without transferable utility between household members. We build on this last result to provide a primal and dual linear programming characterization of a stable matching allocation for the observational setting at hand. This provides an explicit specification of the marital surplus function rationalizing the observed matching behavior.

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  • Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Frederic Vermeulen, 2017. "Stable Marriage With and Without Transferable Utility:Nonparametric Testable Implications," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2017-30, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  • Handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/255694

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Alj, Abdelkamel & Jónasson, Kristján & Mélard, Guy, 2016. "The exact Gaussian likelihood estimation of time-dependent VARMA models," Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 633-644.
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    5. Francq, Christian & Gautier, Antony, 2004. "Estimation of time-varying ARMA models with Markovian changes in regime," Statistics & Probability Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 243-251, December.
    6. Pham, Tuan D. & Tran, Lanh T., 1985. "Some mixing properties of time series models," Stochastic Processes and their Applications, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 297-303, April.
    7. Abdelouahab Bibi & Christian Francq, 2003. "Consistent and asymptotically normal estimators for cyclically time-dependent linear models," Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Springer;The Institute of Statistical Mathematics, vol. 55(1), pages 41-68, March.
    8. Andrews, Donald W.K., 1988. "Laws of Large Numbers for Dependent Non-Identically Distributed Random Variables," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(03), pages 458-467, December.
    9. repec:bla:scjsta:v:44:y:2017:i:3:p:617-635 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item


    marriage stability; household consumption; nonparametric testable implications; transferable utility;

    JEL classification:

    • C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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