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Responsabilité et indépendance du conseil d’administration : Les apports de l’analyse économique


  • Antoine Rebérioux


Board of directors independence has been a focus for a large series of studies in finance. The overall evidence suggests that independence has no or negative effect on firm performance. Director accountability constitutes a second topic of research, in law and economics. Two distinctive models might be identified. The first one gives primacy to the interests of shareholders, whereas the other advocates enlarged fiduciary duties for directors. We argue that these two issues (independence and accountability) are related. In particular, we show that independence is a strong implication only for the shareholder model of accountability. In turn, the way the poor results of independency are accounted for crucially depends on the way director accountability is analyzed.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoine Rebérioux, 2008. "Responsabilité et indépendance du conseil d’administration : Les apports de l’analyse économique," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-37, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
  • Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2008-37

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    corporate governance; board of directors; theory of the firm;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law


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