Employer Sanctions, Illegal Migration and Welfare
Despite border enforcement and penalties for firms that hire illegal migrants, the presence of illegal migrants in most economies still persists. This paper assumes a Ricardian economy and analyzes migration of illegal unskilled workers in a model of Cournot Duopoly where firms are producing homogenous and non-traded goods, and hiring illegal migrants. A two-stage simultaneous move game is set up: In stage 1, for a given technology and vigilance level, each individual firm will decide whether to hire illegal migrants. In stage 2, each firm will choose the Cournot output level. Using this structure, we demonstrate that hiring illegal migrants is not necessarily welfare-reducing for a given industry and furthermore the presence of illegal migrants creates more employment for domestic workers.
|Date of creation:||09 Feb 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood 3125|
Phone: 61 3 9244 3815
Fax: +61 3 5227 2655
Web page: http://www.deakin.edu.au/buslaw/aef/index.php
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2010_01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dr Xueli Tang)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.