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La politique de dividende permet-elle de discipliner les dirigeants?

Listed author(s):
  • Michel Albouy


    (Université de Grenoble IAE)

  • Alain Schatt


    (Université de Bourgogne IAE LEG UMR Cnrs 5118)

Depuis près de 25 ans, la théorie de l’agence (Easterbrook, 1984 ; Jensen, 1986) postule que les actionnaires demandent des dividendes pour discipliner les dirigeants. Une analyse approfondie de la littérature montre cependant que la politique de dividende ne constitue pas un mécanisme efficace de gouvernance, pour au moins trois raisons : les attentes des divers groupes d’actionnaires sont variées en matière de versement de dividendes ; les entreprises concernées présentent des caractéristiques spécifiques ; la gouvernance des entreprises est de « faible » qualité du point de vue des actionnaires minoritaires.

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Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 1100603.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2010
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1100603
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Order Information: Postal: Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

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