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La politique de dividende permet-elle de discipliner les dirigeants?

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Albouy

    () (Université de Grenoble IAE)

  • Alain Schatt

    () (Université de Bourgogne IAE LEG UMR Cnrs 5118)

Abstract

Depuis près de 25 ans, la théorie de l’agence (Easterbrook, 1984 ; Jensen, 1986) postule que les actionnaires demandent des dividendes pour discipliner les dirigeants. Une analyse approfondie de la littérature montre cependant que la politique de dividende ne constitue pas un mécanisme efficace de gouvernance, pour au moins trois raisons : les attentes des divers groupes d’actionnaires sont variées en matière de versement de dividendes ; les entreprises concernées présentent des caractéristiques spécifiques ; la gouvernance des entreprises est de « faible » qualité du point de vue des actionnaires minoritaires.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Albouy & Alain Schatt, 2010. "La politique de dividende permet-elle de discipliner les dirigeants?," Working Papers CREGO 1100603, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1100603
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    Cited by:

    1. OUATTARA, Aboudou, 2017. "Politique de distribution de dividendes des sociétés cotées sur les marchés en développement : Cas de la BRVM
      [Dividend policy of companies listed in developing financial markets: Case study of the
      ," MPRA Paper 79839, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Mohamed Ali AZOUZI & Anis JARBOUI, 2012. "Ceo Emotional Bias And Capital Structure Choice. Bayesian Network Method," Business Excellence and Management, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 2(2), pages 47-70, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    dividendes; fiscalité; asymétrie d’information; biais comportementaux; opportunités d’investissement; gouvernance; parties prenantes.;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy

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