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Conseil d'administration et pouvoirs dans l'entreprise;The board of directors:a mechanism inside the corporate governance system

Listed author(s):
  • Gérard Charreaux


    (Université de Bourgogne)

(VF)L'objectif de cet article est de faire une synthèse des analyses théoriques (issues des théories de l'agence et des coûts de transaction) et des résultats empiriques concernant le conseil d'administration. Après avoir rappelé le cadre d'analyse de cet organe proposé par la théorie de l'agence, ce dernier est présenté comme un maillon du système de gouvernement des entreprises, avant d'examiner comment s'exerce sa fonction disciplinaire au moyen de deux leviers, la politique de rémunération et de révocation des dirigeants. Enfin, il étudie la relation présumée entre le conseil d'administration et la performance de la firme. Cet article conclut à une efficacité limitée du conseil d'administration comme organe disciplinaire qui s'explique par le comportement d'enracinement des dirigeants, les stratégies personnelles des administrateurs et l'hétérogénéité de sa composition. Une éventuelle réforme du rôle de cet organe suppose cependant, et préalablement, une meilleure compréhension de son articulation avec les autres mécanismes composant le système de gouvernement des entreprises.(VA)The objective of this article is to make a synthesis of the theoretical analyses (resulting from the agency theory and the transaction costs theory) and of the empirical results concerning the board of directors. After having recalled the main features of the framework of analysis of this disciplinary mechanism proposed by agency theory, the board of directors is presented as a component of the corporate governance system, before examining how its disciplinary function is exerted through two levers, the compensation policy and the managers' revocation. Lastly, the supposed relation existing between the board of directors and the performance of the firm is examined. This article shows a limited efficiency of the board of directors as a disciplinary mechanism, which is explained by the managers' entrenchment behavior, the directors' personal strategies and the heterogeneity of the board of directors. A reform of the role of this mechanism supposes however, and beforehand, a better understanding of its articulation with the other mechanisms composing thecorporat governance system.

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Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 0931001.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Oct 1993
Publication status: Published in Revue d'Economie Financière, n° 31, hiver 1994, p.49-79 et repris dans G. Charreaux (éd.), Le gouvernement des entreprises, Economica,janvier 1997,p.141-164.
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:0931001
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Order Information: Postal: Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

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