Equilibria of a Two-Person Non-Zero Sum Noisy Game of Timing
Necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained for the existence of an equilibrium point (as well as for the existence of a dominating equilibrium point) in a two-person non-zero sum game of timing.
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 579.
|Date of creation:||Jan 1981|
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