The Case for a Populist Central Banker
We present a general equilibrium optimizing model in which we study the joint effects of centralization of wage setting and central bank conservatism on economic performance. Several striking conclusions emerge. IN relatively centralized labor markets employment and output are decreasing, and inflation is initially increasing and then decreasing, in the degree of central bank conservatism. A radical-populist central banker who cares not at all about inflation (alternatively, who is not conservative) maximizes social welfare.
|Date of creation:||1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012|
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Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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|Order Information:|| Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012|
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