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Interconnexion de réseaux et qualité de l’infrastructure comme barrière à l’entrée : quels instruments de régulation?

Author

Listed:
  • Edmond BARANES

    (Université d’Artois & Eurequa, Université de Paris I)

  • Laurent FLOCHEL

    (EPEE, Université d’Evry - Val d’Essone & Eurequa, Université de Paris I)

Abstract

Nous étudions l’ouverture à la concurrence d’un bien réseau dans lequel l’opérateur historique, intégré verticalement, gère en monopole l’infrastructure et est concurrencé sur le secteur des services. La qualité du bien réseau est le minimum des qualités de chaque composante. Nous montrons que l’opérateur historique peut utiliser la qualité de son infrastructure comme instrument stratégique de barrière à l’entrée. Nous comparons alors l’efficacité de deux régimes de régulation, selon que l’agence ne peut réguler que la charge d’accès ou qu’elle peut réguler également la qualité de l’infrastructure.

Suggested Citation

  • Edmond BARANES & Laurent FLOCHEL, 1999. "Interconnexion de réseaux et qualité de l’infrastructure comme barrière à l’entrée : quels instruments de régulation?," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1999012, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:1999012
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    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/REL/1999012.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Sami Debbichi & Walid Hichri, 2014. "Market Power and Collusion on Interconnection Phone Market in Tunisia : What Lessons from International Experiences," Working Papers halshs-00956638, HAL.
    2. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-580 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L90 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - General

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