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Externalities of the Microsoft’s Network Goods

Author

Listed:
  • João Leitão

    () (Departamento de Gestão e Economia, Universidade da Beira Interior)

  • Carlos Osório

    () (Departamento de Gestão e Economia, Universidade da Beira Interior)

Abstract

This paper aims to make a public statement about the strategy implemented by Microsoft in order to reinforce its market power across the networked users of Windows Operative System, and Xbox Games Console. It is presented an economic view that supports the anticipating (not predatory) position assumed by Microsoft against its direct competitors.

Suggested Citation

  • João Leitão & Carlos Osório, 2002. "Externalities of the Microsoft’s Network Goods," Working Papers de Gestão, Economia e Marketing (Management, Economics and Marketing Working Papers) 07/2002, Universidade da Beira Interior, Departamento de Gestão e Economia (Portugal).
  • Handle: RePEc:csh:wpecon:07/2002
    as

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    File URL: http://www.dge.ubi.pt/investigacao/TDiscussao/TD072002.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wang, Ruqu, 2001. "Optimal pricing strategy for durable-goods monopoly," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 789-804, May.
    2. Driskill, Robert, 2001. "Durable goods oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 391-413, March.
    3. Bulow, Jeremy I, 1982. "Durable-Goods Monopolists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 314-332, April.
    4. Davidson, Carl & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1990. "Excess Capacity and Collusion," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(3), pages 521-541, August.
    5. Faruk Gul, 1987. "Noncooperative Collusion in Durable Goods Oligopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 248-254.
    6. Karp, Larry, 1996. "Depreciation erodes the Coase Conjecture," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 473-490, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Externalities; Microsoft; Software Industry; Regulation Policies;

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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