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Is it Harmful to Allow partial Cooperation ?

Author

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  • Paul Beaudry

    (Crest)

  • Pierre Cahuc

    (Crest)

  • Hubert Kempf

    (Crest)

Abstract

In economics, politics and society, examples abound in economics, politics and society where agents can enter partial cooperation schemes, i.e., they can collude with a subset of agents. Several contributions devoted to specific settings have claimed that such partial cooperation actually worsens welfare compared to the no‐cooperation situation. Our paper assesses this view by highlighting the forces that lead to such results. We find that the nature of strategic spillovers is central to determining whether partial cooperation is bad. Our propositions are then applied to various examples as industry wage bargaining or local public goods. JEL classification: C72; E62; J5
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Suggested Citation

  • Paul Beaudry & Pierre Cahuc & Hubert Kempf, 1999. "Is it Harmful to Allow partial Cooperation ?," Working Papers 99-39, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    • Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:99-39
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    Cited by:

    1. Patricia Sanz‐Córdoba & Bernd Theilen, 2018. "Partial Tax Harmonization Through Infrastructure Coordination," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 1399-1416, April.
    2. Hendrik Vrijburg & Ruud A. de Mooij, 2010. "Enhanced Coorporation in an asymmetric model of Tax Competition," Working Papers 1002, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
    3. Yutao Han, 2013. "Who benefits from partial tax coordination?," DEM Discussion Paper Series 13-24, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    4. Emmanuelle Taugourdeau & Jean-pierre Vidal, 2014. "The tax competition game revisited: When leadership may be optimal," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(1), pages 51-62.
    5. Bo Sandemann Rasmussen, "undated". "Partial vs. Global Coordination of Capital Income Tax Policies," Economics Working Papers 2001-3, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    6. Marta Lukáčová & Jaroslav Korečko & Sylvia Jenčová & Mária Jusková, 2020. "Analysis of selected indicators of tax competition and tax harmonization in the EU," Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues, VsI Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Center, vol. 8(1), pages 123-137, September.
    7. Sanz Córdoba, Patricia & Theilen, Bernd, 1965-, 2017. "Strategic Responses to International Tax Competition: Fiscal (De) Centralization versus Partial Tax Harmonization," Working Papers 2072/306513, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    8. Leon Bettendorf & Albert Van Der Horst & Ruud A. De Mooij & Hendrik Vrijburg, 2010. "Corporate Tax Consolidation and Enhanced Cooperation in the European Union," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 31(4), pages 453-479, December.
    9. Lina Mallozzi & Stef Tijs, 2012. "Stackelberg Assumption vs. Nash Assumption in Partially Cooperative Games," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 5-13, March.
    10. Yutao Han & Xi Wan, 2019. "Who benefits from partial tax coordination?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(5), pages 1620-1640, May.
    11. Kächelein, Holger, 2004. "Capital Tax Competition and Partial Cooperation : Welfare Enhancing or not?," BERG Working Paper Series 51, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining

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