Is it Harmful to Allow partial Cooperation ?
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- Hendrik Vrijburg & Ruud A. De Mooij, 2010.
"Enhanced Cooperation in an Asymmetric Model of Tax Competition,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
2915, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hendrik Vrijburg & Ruud A. de Mooij, 2010. "Enhanced Cooperation in an Asymmetric Model of Tax Competition," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-011/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- Hendrik Vrijburg & Ruud A. de Mooij, 2010. "Enhanced Coorporation in an asymmetric model of Tax Competition," Working Papers 1002, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
- Emmanuelle Taugourdeau & Jean-pierre Vidal, 2014.
"The tax competition game revisited: When leadership may be optimal,"
AccessEcon, vol. 34(1), pages 51-62.
- Emmanuelle Taugourdeau & Jean-Pierre Vidal, 2014. "The tax competition game revisited: When leadership may be optimal," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01044913, HAL.
- Leon Bettendorf & Albert Van Der Horst & Ruud A. De Mooij & Hendrik Vrijburg, 2010.
"Corporate Tax Consolidation and Enhanced Cooperation in the European Union,"
Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 31(4), pages 453-479, December.
- Leon Bettendorf & Albert van der Horst & Ruud de Mooij & Hendrik Vrijburg, 2009. "Corporate tax consolidation and enhanced cooperation in the European Union," CPB Discussion Paper 132, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Leon Bettendorf & Albert van der Horst & Ruud A. de Mooij & Hendrik Vrijburg, 2010. "Corporate tax consolidation and enhanced coorporation in the European Union," Working Papers 1001, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
- Bo Sandemann Rasmussen, "undated". "Partial vs. Global Coordination of Capital Income Tax Policies," Economics Working Papers 2001-3, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
- Lina Mallozzi & Stef Tijs, 2012. "Stackelberg Assumption vs. Nash Assumption in Partially Cooperative Games," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 5-13, March.
- Hendrik Vrijburg & Ruud Mooij, 2016.
"Tax rates as strategic substitutes,"
International Tax and Public Finance,
Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(1), pages 2-24, February.
- Yutao Han, 2013. "Who benefits from partial tax coordination?," CREA Discussion Paper Series 13-24, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
- Sanz Córdoba, Patrícia & Theilen, Bernd, 1965-, 2016. "Partial tax harmonization through infrastructure coordination," Working Papers 2072/261535, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
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