Takeover Bids and the Relative Prices of Shares that Differ in their Voting Rights
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References listed on IDEAS
- Avner Shaked & John Sutton, 1982. "Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(1), pages 3-13.
- Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Gardiol, Lucien & Gibson-Asner, Rajna & Tuchschmid, Nils S., 1997. "Are liquidity and corporate control priced by shareholders? Empirical evidence from Swiss dual class shares," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 299-323, December.
- Bruner, Robert F., 1999. "An analysis of value destruction and recovery in the alliance and proposed merger of Volvo and Renault," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 125-166, January.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/9321 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsTakeovers; Voting Rights; Shares; Ownership Structure;
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