Time-inconsistency, Democracy and Optimal Contingent Rules
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- Minford, Patrick, 1995. "Time-Inconsistency, Democracy, and Optimal Contingent Rules," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(2), pages 195-210, April.
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- Lippi, Francesco & Swank, Otto H., 1999. "Rational Voters, Elections, and Central Banks: Do Representative Democracies Need Nonrepresentative Institutions?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 515-525, July.
- Adriel Jost, 2018. "Cultural Differences in Monetary Policy Preferences," Working Papers 2018-02, Swiss National Bank.
- Carl E. Walsh, 2002. "When should central bankers be fired?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, March.
- Herrendorf, Berthold, 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Way of Precommitment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 431-448, July.
- Iannis A. Mourmouras & Michael G. Arghyrou, 1999. "Monetary Policy at the European Periphery. Greek Experience and Lessons for Transition Economies," CERT Discussion Papers 9910, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
- António Caleiro, 2005.
"How to Classify a Government? Can a Neural Network do it?,"
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- Caleiro, António, 2005. "How to Classify a Government? Can a Neural Network do it?," EconStor Preprints 142736, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
- Patrick Minford & David Peel, 2003. "Optimal monetary policy: is price-level targeting the next step?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 50(5), pages 650-667, November.
More about this item
KeywordsDiscriminatory Punishment; Elections; Monitoring; Rules Versus Discretion; Time Inconsistency; Tying of Hands;
- E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
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