The Ex Ante Auction Model for the Control of Market Power in Standard Setting Organizations
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Keywordsauctions; fairness; licensing; standard setting;
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-06-02 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2007-06-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IPR-2007-06-02 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-LAW-2007-06-02 (Law & Economics)
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