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Do Retail Incentives Work in Privatizations?

Author

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  • Keloharju, Matti
  • Knüpfer, Samuli
  • Torstila, Sami

Abstract

20 countries around the world have used incentive packages, including bonus shares and discounts, to attract retail investors to participate in privatizations. Using a unique dataset, we estimate the total cost of incentive packages at approximately $27 billion. The expiration of bonus share plans is associated with a six-day abnormal return of -1.1% and a long-term increase in volume. Incentives have been surprisingly effective in meeting stated privatization objectives. A dollar spent on retail incentives helps to attract about 21 times as many investors as a dollar spent on underpricing. Individual-level analysis shows that flipping is not only much reduced in the short term, but also declines by at least 15% over a period of 1,000 trading days.

Suggested Citation

  • Keloharju, Matti & Knüpfer, Samuli & Torstila, Sami, 2004. "Do Retail Incentives Work in Privatizations?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4612, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4612
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    Cited by:

    1. Guedhami, Omrane & Pittman, Jeffrey A. & Saffar, Walid, 2009. "Auditor choice in privatized firms: Empirical evidence on the role of state and foreign owners," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2-3), pages 151-171, December.
    2. Lulu Gu & W. Robert Reed, 2011. "One For All or All For One? Using Multiple-listing Information in Event Studies," Working Papers in Economics 11/33, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
    3. Bortolotti, Bernardo & de Jong, Frank & Nicodano, Giovanna & Schindele, Ibolya, 2007. "Privatization and stock market liquidity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 297-316, February.
    4. repec:eee:transa:v:103:y:2017:i:c:p:135-153 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Kaustia, Markku & Knüpfer, Samuli, 2012. "Peer performance and stock market entry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 321-338.
    6. Paul B. McGuinness, 2016. "Post-IPO performance and its association with subscription cascades and issuers’ strategic-political importance," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 291-333, February.
    7. Gu, Lulu & Reed, W. Robert, 2013. "Information asymmetry, market segmentation, and cross-listing: Implications for event study methodology," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 28-40.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bonus shares; discounts; equity offerings; flipping; privatization;

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

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