Active Agents, Passive Principals: Does High-Powered CEO Compensation Really Improve Incentives
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- García, Diego, 2014. "Optimal contracts with privately informed agents and active principals," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 695-709.
- Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, 2002. "Corporate governance in the UK : contrasted with the US system," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 3(3), pages 13-22, October.
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Keywordsagency theory; executive compensation; free-cash-flow theory; strategic complexity;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
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