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Beyond ESG: Executive Pay Metrics and Shareholder Support

Author

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  • Gantchev, Nickolay
  • Giannetti, Mariassunta
  • Hober, Marcus

Abstract

Using a novel global dataset of executive pay contracts, we show that the surge in ESG and other compensation metrics is more about securing shareholder consent than directing managerial effort. ESG metrics – classified according to SASB standards – are often added in areas of existing strength, with negligible impact on overall ESG outcomes. Instead, metrics of any type are added after high say-on-pay dissent and are often chosen to align with proxy advisors’ preferences. Pay metrics increase say-on-pay approval and reduce both shareholder proposals and shareholder dissent on managerial proposals. These findings challenge contract theory’s prediction that metrics are selected to direct attention to neglected objectives and suggest that the surge in ESG and other metrics reflects conformity pressures and the desire to appease shareholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Gantchev, Nickolay & Giannetti, Mariassunta & Hober, Marcus, 2025. "Beyond ESG: Executive Pay Metrics and Shareholder Support," CEPR Discussion Papers 20818, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20818
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    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP20818
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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