Adverse Selection of Investment Projects and the Business Cycle
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- Pietro Reichlin & Paolo Siconolfi, 1998. "Adverse Selection of Investment Projects and the Business Cycle," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 326, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Reichlin, P. & Siconolfi, P., 1998. "Adverse Selection of Investment Projects and the Business Cycle," Papers 326, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Lippi, Francesco, 2000.
"Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatism,"
Springer, vol. 105(3-4), pages 323-338, December.
- Lippi, F., 1999. "Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatis," Papers 351, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
- Francesco Lippi, 1999. "Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatism," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 351, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Delli Gatti, Domenico & Gallegati, Mauro & Giulioni, Gianfranco & Palestrini, Antonio, 2003.
"Financial fragility, patterns of firms' entry and exit and aggregate dynamics,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 79-97, May.
- Domenico Delli Gatti, Mauro Gallegati, Gianfranco Giulioni, Antonio Palestrini, -DISCUSSANT: Thomas Brenner, 2000. "Financial Fragility, Patterns Of Firms' Entry And Exit And Aggregate Dynamics," Computing in Economics and Finance 2000 282, Society for Computational Economics.
- Pietro Reichlin & Paolo Siconolfi, 2004.
"Optimal debt contracts and moral hazard along the business cycle,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(1), pages 75-109, July.
- Reichlin, Pietro & Siconolfi, Paolo, 2000. "Optimal Debt Contracts and Moral Hazard Along the Business Cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 2351, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
More about this item
KeywordsAdverse Selection; Business Cycle; Financial Intermediation;
- A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
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