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Adverse Selection of Investment Projects and the Business Cycle

Author

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  • Reichlin, Pietro
  • Siconolfi, Paolo

Abstract

In an economy where entrepreneurs with unequal ‘abilities’ face alternative investment projects, which differ in their degree of risk and productivity, we analyse the Nash equilibrium contracts arising from a banks-borrowers game in the context of asymmetric information. We show that, for a particular characterization of the game, one can determine the endogenous distribution of projects and the ‘type’ of contracts (pooling or separating) as functions of the amount of loanable funds. We then apply this game to a general equilibrium aggregative economy with production, populated by overlapping generations of borrowers and lenders. We show that, for a range of parameter values, equilibria are characterized by persistent endogenous cycles.

Suggested Citation

  • Reichlin, Pietro & Siconolfi, Paolo, 1997. "Adverse Selection of Investment Projects and the Business Cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 1631, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1631
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    Cited by:

    1. Lippi, Francesco, 2000. "Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(3-4), pages 323-338, December.
    2. Delli Gatti, Domenico & Gallegati, Mauro & Giulioni, Gianfranco & Palestrini, Antonio, 2003. "Financial fragility, patterns of firms' entry and exit and aggregate dynamics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 79-97, May.
    3. Pietro Reichlin & Paolo Siconolfi, 2004. "Optimal debt contracts and moral hazard along the business cycle," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(1), pages 75-109, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Adverse Selection; Business Cycle; Financial Intermediation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

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