Heterogeneous probabilities in complete asset markets
We show in this paper how, in a model of assets exchange in complete competitive markets, heterogeneity of the agent’s sub jective probabilities generates aggregate expenditures for Arrow-Debreu securities that have the gross substitutability property, with the consequences that competitive equilibrium is unique, stable in any tatonnement process, and that the weak axiom of revealed preferences is satisﬁed in the aggregate. For this result, heterogeneity is required to be highest among people who have the largest risk aversion
|Date of creation:||01 Mar 1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)|
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1998019. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.