Markets, Arbitrage and Social Choices
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- Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1996. "Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the non-emptiness of the core," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 177-180, August.
- Joseph M. Ostroy, 1995. "Arbitrage of the Flattening Effect of Large Numbers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 737, UCLA Department of Economics.
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