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Using Rules-of-Thumb: A Note on Sophisticated vs. Simple Mixing in Two-Player Randomly Matched Games

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  • Christian Alcocer; Thomas D. Jeitschko
  • Thomas D. Jeitschko

Abstract

We postulate a new behavioral bias in how people play mixed strategies by proposing the existence of simple players who lack strategic depth; in a sense, they are the simplest possible agents that do not directly contradict the economic principle of utility maximization. We deOne them as those who, when indi§erent between choices, follow a simple rule-of-thumb and assign a predetermined probability to each. We show that if they play 2 2 games, an equilibrium generally fails to exist. However, under random matching within populations with some proportion of simple players, equilibrium is restored and is indistinguishable from Nash equilibria in games with unrestricted strategy choices, as long as the percentage of simple mixers is small enough. As such, players are unable to take advantage of the presence of simple mixers, and simple mixers do no worse than more sophisticated players.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Alcocer; Thomas D. Jeitschko & Thomas D. Jeitschko, 2018. "Using Rules-of-Thumb: A Note on Sophisticated vs. Simple Mixing in Two-Player Randomly Matched Games," Vniversitas Económica 16344, Universidad Javeriana - Bogotá.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000416:016344
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Behavioral; Bounded Rationality; Mixed Equilibria;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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